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Abstract 
This study aims to investigate some of the most important corporate governance mechanisms and information asymmetry in 
Tehran's stock exchange. The percentage of institutional investment, ownership concentration, type of auditors, and the 
independence of board members have been used as the corporate governance mechanisms, and also changes in the liquidity of 
the stock market have been used as an indicator for information asymmetry. The statistical population of this study is companies 
accepted in Tehran's Stock Exchange and research sample has been selected by using the systematic sampling Cup method and 
applying the conditions of research variables to 145 companies from 22 industries during 2008-2013. The research findings show 
that there is a negative and significant relationship between the percentage of institutional investments and the independence of 
board members, and bid-ask spread, and there is a positive and significant relationship between ownership concentration and the 
bid-ask spread. Also, the obtained results show that there is no relationship between the variables of the type of auditor and bid-
ask spread. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Peer-review under responsibility of Academic World Research and Education Center. 
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1. Introduction 
 
According to accounting standards, the main purpose of preparation of financial statements is revealing financial 
information and providing useful information regarding financial status and results of operations of the business 
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units. Nowadays, hardly anyone can ignore the importance of transparency in financial reporting, because 
shareholders and creditors make their important investment decisions based on the financial information of 
corporations. They demand higher quantity and transparency in the information about the organizational 
performances. Complete and transparent disclosure of financial reporting can provide a secure condition and 
increase the confidence of the investors. Transparency has a positive impact on corporate performance and can 
protect the interests of shareholders. Obscure financial statements, will hide the amount of organizational debt, 
especially when the company is on the verge of bankruptcy. Therefore, transparency is very attractive for 
shareholders. 
Efficient corporate governance mechanisms are vital for the proper functioning of capital markets and the whole 
economy and necessary to attract and retain public confidence. Proper corporate governance makes sure that firms 
can efficiently utilize their capital. Additionally, this makes sure that firms can consider benefits of a wide range of 
interest groups and also the community of workers in that firm and the board of directors are held accountable 
against shareholders and the company. When the corporate governance structure suffers from poor principals, 
conflicts between big and small investors will also increase.  
 
2. Review of Literature 
 
Genic et al (2005) investigated the information asymmetry during profit declaration and showed that profit 
declaration, according to the proposed transaction price gap index and does not cause significant changes in the 
volume of stock. A cross-sectional analysis has shown that it is partly related to the changes in the information 
asymmetry. 
Kai et al (2008) investigated the asymmetric effects on the three main corporate governance mechanisms (the 
monitoring intensity the board of directors, market discipline (based on the use of anti-academic measures) and 
payment sensitivity for the performance for senior management).They found that firms with more information 
asymmetry tend to use lower board monitoring, market discipline, and have a higher performance of their senior 
management. 
Ben Ali (2009) showed that the U.S. institutional investors in France, reduce agency costs and the demand for 
better and more useful disclosure and consequently, information asymmetry. 
Gu & Hackbarthe (2013) over investigated the interaction between accounting transparency and corporate 
governance over 1990 to 2006 and stated that firms with strong corporate governance, continuously experience 
abnormal returns and increased transparency. They found supporting evidence regarding that corporate governance 
and transparency actually complete each other. 
 
3. Research Hypotheses 
 
1. There is a significant relationship between ownership percentage of institutional shareholders and bid-ask spread. 
2. There is a significant relationship between ownership concentration and bid-ask spread. 
3. There is a significant relationship between the type of auditor and bid-ask spread. 
4. There is a significant relationship between independence of board members and bid-ask spread. 
 
4. Materials and Methods 
 
4.1. Type of Research Methodology 
 
This research is practical in terms of purpose and is conducted by using the Multivariate Regression method and 
econometric models. Research hypotheses are tested based on the combined data and statistical analysis are 
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performed using Reviews 6 software. The statistical population is composed of listed companies in Tehran's Stock 
Exchange. The time domain is set for a period of 6 years, from the beginning of 2008 until the end of 2013. 
 
5. Research Variable  
 
5.1. Independent Variables 
 
ܥܩ௡: Corporate Governance Mechanisms. The following four mechanisms have been used in this study: 
1. Ownership percentage of institutional shareholders 
2. Ownership concentration 
3. Type of auditor 
4. Independence of the board of director's members. 
 
5.2. Control Variables 
 
ܵܫܼܧ௜௧: Company size which is obtained from the logarithm of total assets. 
ܮܧ ௜ܸ௧: Financial leverage of the company which is equal to company’s total debts divided by its total assets. 
ܩܱ௜௧: Opportunities for business growth which is calculated by market price divided by earnings per share. 
ܯܤ ௜ܸ௧: The ratio of market value over the book value of the company's shares. 
 
5.3. Specifying and Estimating the Model 
 
The following models have been used to test the research hypotheses: 
ܤܫܦ̴ܣܵܭ௜௧ ൌ ߚଵ ൅ ߚଶܥܩ௜௧ ൅ ߚଷܵܫܼܧ௜௧ ൅ ߚସܮܧ ௜ܸ௧ ൅ ߚହܩܱ௜௧ ൅ ߚ଺ܯܤ ௜ܸ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ 
 
Table 1.Chow and Hausman Test Results 
Model Type of Test Test Statistic Significance Level Test Result 
The first model 
Chow test 3.5731 0.000 Conformation of the fixed effect model against the data integration model 
Hausman test 5.8492 0.0030 Conformation of the fixed effect model against the random effect 
The second 
model 
Chow test 3.2341 0.000 Conformation of the fixed effect model against the data integration model 
Hausman test 3.4536 0.0018 Conformation of the fixed effect model against the random effect 
The third model 
Chow test 4.0459 0.000 Conformation of the fixed effect model against the data integration model 
Hausman test 3.3769 0.0007 Conformation of the fixed effect model against the random effect 
The fourth 
model 
Chow test 2.0648 0.000 Conformation of the fixed effect model against the data integration model 
Hausman test 2.0846 0.9436 Conformation of the fixed effect model against the random effect 
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Based on the results listed in table 1, the fixed effects model is chosen as the first, second, and the third research 
model and the random effect model is chosen as the fourth research model. 
The estimation results for the first model are presented in table 2. As it can be seen in table 2, the coefficient 
percent of institutional investors' ownership is negative and statistically significant. Thus the first research 
hypothesis is confirmed.  
 
Table 2.The Estimation Results for the First Model 
Dependent Variable: ܤܫܦ̴ܣܵܭ 
Explanatory Variable Combined Data Test Coefficient t Statistic P-Value 
CG -0.4795 -3.2679 0.000 
SIZE -5.7531 -2.560 0.0076 
LEV -4.5415 -4.3657 0.000 
GO -0.3156 -2.7892 0.328 
MBV -0.4536 -1.3547 0.068 
C 136.9852 1.7248 0.6589 
F Statistic 2.8544 
P-value 0.000 
ܴଶ 0.6532 
Adjusted ܴଶ 0.4452 
 
Based on the results listed in table 1, the research model for ownership concentration is presented in table 3 along 
with the constant estimation effects and estimation results. As table 3 indicates, ownership concentration factor is 
positive and statistically significant. Thus the second research hypothesis for the companies is confirmed.  
 
Table 3. The Estimation Results For the Second Model 
Dependent Variable: ܤܫܦ̴ܣܵܭ 
Explanatory Variable Combined Data Test  Coefficient t Statistic P-Value 
CG 0.543 3.9854 0.0347 
SIZE -1.3451 -2.7845 0.1262 
LEV -4.4136 -9.4872 0.000 
GO -0.2715 -6.0354 0.3745 
MBV -0.3863 -2.0335 0.0427 
C 58.2185 9.2487 0.0004 
F Statistic 8.4756 
P-value 0.0000 
ܴଶ 0.4925 
Adjusted ܴଶ 0.3249 
 
Based on the results listed in table 1, the research model for the type of auditor is presented in table 4 along with 
the random estimation effects and estimation results. As table 4 indicates, the coefficient of type of auditor is 
positive and not statistically significant. Thus the third research hypothesis for the companies is not confirmed. 
 
Table 4. The Estimation Results for the Third Model 
Dependent Variable: ܤܫܦ̴ܣܵܭ 
Explanatory Variable Combined Data Test Coefficient t Statistic P-Value 
CG 1.2485 5.3645 0.3745 
SIZE -2.4875 -3.4518 0.0045 
LEV -5.1247 -8.5986 0.000 
GO -0.6584 -1.2349 0.0129 
MBV -0.9584 -0.34561 0.3459 
C 129.2658 4.5687 0.000 
F Statistic 7.3584 
P-value 0.0000 
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ܴଶ 0.4105 
Adjusted ܴଶ 0.3501 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This research was carried out in order to examine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on 
information asymmetry in listed companies in Tehran's Stock Exchange during 2008-2013. The findings of the 
present study suggest that there is a negative and significant relationship between the percentage of institutional 
ownership and the independence of the board of the directors' members andbid-ask spread, and also there is positive 
and significant relationship between ownership concentration and bid-ask spread. The obtained results indicate that 
there is no relationship between the variables of type of auditor and bid-ask spread. These results are in line with 
findings of Giang& Kim (2000), Ben Ali (2009), and Nasrallahi et al (2011). 
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